TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION
Financial relationships between the pharmaceutical and medical device industries and health care professionals and institutions have led to concern about commercial infuences on medical practice, research, publication, and education. 1 Congressional investigations, prosecutions, press reports, and published studies have generated public awareness of the pervasive nature of these relationships.
2 Along with other dimensions of professional activity, public inquiry has focused sharply on the implications of conficts of interest in clinical research for both the safety and welfare of research participants and the integrity of research results. 3 A common response to the problem of conficts of interest in clinical research has been to urge greater transparency about the relationships among industry, researchers, and academic medical institutions. 4 In this White Paper, we argue that public policy should encourage researchers and institutions to make information about their fnancial relationships with industry available to the public, but-contrary to many other commentators' recommendations-we conclude that disclosure of fnancial information should not routinely be required as part of the informed consent process. While we recognize the importance of transparency as an ethical value, incorporating fnancial issues into the informed consent process would provide few, if any benefts to research participants and could in fact cause signifcant harms. This White Paper also reiterates our prior recommendations for direct measures to eliminate, reduce, and manage problematic fnancial relationships in clinical research.
Financial Relationships in Clinical Research
Before 1980, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded most clinical trials. While NIH remains the single largest source of federal funding, between 2003 and 2007 NIH funding for biomedical research declined 8.6% when adjusted for infation. 5 Total federal funding for biomedical research increased during that period, but by less than 1%. 6 By contrast, industry funding of medical research increased by 25% between 2003 and 2007. 7 Today, pharmaceutical and medical device companies fund nearly 80% more clinical trials than NIH. 8 Various fnancial arrangements between industry and investigators or research institutions are possible. Often, pharmaceutical and medical device companies pay investigators or their employers a per capita fee for each participant enrolled in a study. 9 In academic medicine, payments for conducting clinical trials are made to the investigator's department or institution. While there is typically no direct relationship between the number of participants enrolled and an academic investigator's salary, physicians in academic medicine may fnd that, over time, their compensation refects their overall success in obtaining clinical research funding for their institutions. 10 Moreover, academic physicians have other incentives to conduct externallyfunded research, including the potential for future funding, as well as publication of the results in the medical literature, a requirement for tenure and promotion.
11
In contrast to academic physicians, physicians in private practice are generally paid directly for conducting clinical research. 12 Compensation for clinical research can be a substantial part of a physician practice's income, prompting some physicians to attend seminars on how to make money in clinical research. 13 In some cases, research sponsors may pay so-called "fnder's fees" to individuals other than the investigator-including other physicians, nurses, medical students, or persons already enrolled in a trial-for identifying and referring potential study participants.
14 Although fnd- Drug and device companies that sponsor research may also pay investigators bonuses for meeting certain benchmarks in recruiting or retaining research subjects in a trial. 19 As we observed in our previous White Paper, such bonus payments "could infuence investigators' decisions about prospective participants' initial or continuing eligibility, thereby potentially placing enrollees at risk or undermining the scientifc integrity of the study." 20 Equity interests in the sponsoring company, which give physicians and research institutions a direct stake in the outcome of the research, are a highly controversial form of payment. Recent prosecutions have brought to light several such compensation arrangements. 21 In our previous White Paper, we recommended that the federal government prohibit compensation for research in the form of equity interests in the sponsor of a clinical trial.
22
An increasingly common situation is when an investigator who owns the patent for the device or substance being tested, and/or the investigator's institutional employer, separately incorporates a for-proft subsidiary that owns and will develop the patent for commercial use, and in which the investigator and/or the institution holds signifcant equity interests. This for-proft subsidiary often brings in a large medical device or pharmaceutical company as an additional investor or joint venture partner as the invention comes closer to the clinical trial and market development stage, which may be another source of fnancial beneft to the investigator and institution. Once the product reaches the stage of Phase I trials, the subsidiary will seek relationships with one or more medical centers to host the trials, potentially including the institution with the equity stake. As we observed in our prior White Paper, this scenario is analytically comparable to compensation with an equity interest in the sponsor, and should preclude the patent holder or investor from serving as an investigator. 23 In addition to payments directly related to research, physician-investigators may receive money for consulting, speakers bureau and advisory board participation, and other activities. 24 These payments may infuence physicians' decisions about prescribing, 25 the opinions they offer in the context of continuing medical education, 26 and the study results they report.
27
Finally, as highlighted by prominent prosecutions, companies sometimes design "trials" for products that are already on the market that are little more than guises for growing a new consumer base. 28 One such study enrolled 5,557 individuals in a head-to-head clinical trial of Vioxx and naproxen, with the stated purpose of evaluating Vioxx's gastrointestinal tolerability. 29 In fact, the trial was designed by the marketing department of Vioxx's manufacturer to familiarize primary care prescribers with the benefts of the drug. 30 When companies misleadingly characterize efforts to promote a new product as "scientifc research," they deceive both physicians and the patients they recruit, thereby threatening to undermine the research enterprise as a whole. While anecdotal evidence suggests this practice is now less common in the pharmaceutical sector, it is unclear if it has been eliminated entirely, and whether it persists in the medical device context. In sum, compensation arrangements between industry and physicians who oversee clinical trials raise confict of interest issues that could expose participants to unacceptable risks, undermine the public's confdence in such trials, and affect the integrity of the research results. The shift of clinical trials from academic medical centers to the private practice setting, where trials are pursued as alternative revenue streams, exacerbates these dangers.
Disclosure of Financial Relationships: Existing Law and Guidance
A common response to the problem of conficts of interest in clinical research has been to urge greater transparency about the relationships among industry, researchers, and research institutions. Calls for transparency have taken multiple forms, including mandated disclosure of the relationships to the government, to the researcher's academic home, to the public (often via company websites), 31 or to individual trial participants as part of the process of informed consent. 32 In this section, we summarize existing law and guidance on disclosure of fnancial interests in clinical research. In the remainder of this White Paper, we explain why we support public disclosure of conficts of interest but oppose incorporating discussions about conficts of interest into the process of informed consent. We also reaffrm our earlier conclusion that disclosure should not be seen as a panacea for conficts of interest in clinical research. In itself, disclosure is likely to have only a minimal impact on the problems associated with conficts of interest and must therefore be accompanied by direct regulation of the problematic fnancial relationships themselves.
Existing Law
Clinical trials of drugs and medical devices are regulated by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), which has adopted confict of interest regulations to ensure that steps are "taken in the design, conduct, reporting, and analysis of [clinical trials] to minimize bias." 33 The FDA requires that sponsors submitting marketing applications for drugs and devices provide a list of the investigators who worked on "covered clinical studies," as well as their fnancial interests, as defned by the FDA. 34 The FDA regulations require sponsors to disclose to the FDA the following fnancial interests: (1) fnancial arrangements where the value of the compensation could be infuenced by the outcome of the clinical trial; (2) "signifcant payments of other sorts," such as consulting or speaking fees, in excess of $25,000 from the sponsor to the investigator; (3) any proprietary interest, such as a patent or trademark, in the tested product; and (4) any "signifcant equity interest in the sponsor," defned to include equity in excess of $50,000 in a publicly-traded corporation or any equity in an entity that is not readily valued by reference to public prices. 35 Notably, payments to cover "the costs of conducting the clinical study or other clinical studies" are expressly excluded from the defnition of "signifcant payments of other sorts."
36
In addition to disclosing information about fnancial ties, the FDA also requires research sponsors to report steps taken to minimize the potential for bias. 37 If an investigator's disclosure raises data integrity questions, the FDA may audit the investigator's data, require further analyses or studies, or decline to credit the entire study's results. 38 The FDA's confict of interest regulations do not require or suggest disclosure to prospective participants of investigators' fnancial relationships with industry.
Researchers' compliance with these regulations is defcient. In a 2009 report, the DHHS Offce of Inspector General (OIG) found that only 1% of clinical investigators disclosed any fnancial interest to the FDA, and that 42% of FDA-approved marketing applications were Even when fnancial information was disclosed, the FDA frequently did not document any review of it. 40 The OIG recommended that the FDA require sponsors to submit fnancial information for clinical investigators before clinical trials commence, which is not currently required, and again at the time a marketing application is fled. The OIG also recommended that the FDA take steps to ensure that sponsors submit complete fnancial information for all clinical investigators, and that reviewers consistently review fnancial information and take action in response to disclosed fnancial interests.
41
In addition to the FDA regulations, DHHS has adopted regulations designed to promote objectivity in research funded by the Public Health Service (PHS). These regulations require institutions to maintain and enforce a written policy that reduces or eliminates fnancial conficts of interest. 42 Policies must include provisions for monitoring and reporting of all signifcant fnancial interests of any investigator involved in PHS-funded research. 43 Signifcant fnancial interests are defned to include, but are not limited to, salary, royalties, or other payments in excess of $10,000, equity interests in excess of $10,000 or that represent more than a 5% ownership interest in a single entity, and intellectual property rights such as patents and copyrights. 44 However, investigators must report only signifcant fnancial interests that "would reasonably appear to be affected by the research for which PHS funding is sought." 45 A 2009 report by the DHHS Offce of Inspector General found that 90% of grantee institutions "rely solely on researchers' discretion to determine which of their signifcant fnancial interests are related to their research and are therefore required to be reported." 46 Earlier this year, DHHS sought comments on proposed amendments to these regulations. The amendments would lower the threshold for a "signifcant fnancial interest" from $10,000 to $5,000 47 and would shift the onus of deciding whether a signifcant fnancial interest is related to PHS-funded research from the investigator to the institution itself. 48 Furthermore, in an effort to foster transparency, the proposed revisions would require institutions to post their compliance policies, as well as any known signifcant fnancial conficts of interest of principal or key investigators, on a publicly available web site. 49 The recent health reform legislation, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), requires that, every 90 days beginning on March 31, 2013, pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers notify the federal government of payments or "transfer[s] of value" made to physicians and teaching hospitals, including "stock, a stock option, or any other ownership interest, dividend, proft, or other return on investment," as well as "the name of the covered drug, device, biological, or medical supply" to which the payment is related. 50 The law requires the government to establish a searchable public web site with this information. Importantly, however, publication of payments or transfers of value that relate to "a product research or development agreement for services furnished in connection with research on a potential new medical technology or a new application of an existing medical technology or the development of a new drug, device, biological, or medical supply," or in connection with a clinical trial, shall be suppressed until the manufacturer obtains FDA approval of the product or four years following the date of the compensation. 51 At least six states -California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Vermont, and West Virginia -as well as the District of Columbia, have passed laws requiring disclosure of fnancial relationships between drug and device companies and physicians to an appropriate state agency. 52 Massachusetts, Minnesota and Vermont require disclosure to the public as well. 53 However, when the reporting requirements under PPACA take effect, they will preempt state laws that require redundant reporting. 54 The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
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Most of these states' reporting laws do not require disclosure to research participants of an investigator's or institution's compensation for research, fnancial interests in the outcome of clinical trials, or other fnancial relationships between the sponsor and the investigator or institution. One exception is California, where the informed consent law expressly requires disclosure "both verbally and within the written consent form, in nontechnical terms," of "[t]he material fnancial stake or interest, if any, that the investigator or research institution has in the outcome of the medical experiment." 55 The California law defnes "material" as "ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more in securities or other assets valued at the date of disclosure, or in relevant cumulative salary or other income, regardless of when it is earned or expected to be earned." 56 However, these requirements do not apply to research that is subject to DHHS' regulations on the protection of human research participants. 57 A more recent New Jersey statute covering medical research involving "persons with cognitive impairments, lack of capacity, or serious physical or behavioral conditions and lifethreatening diseases" 58 requires prospective research participants (or their guardians or authorized representatives) to be informed of "the material fnancial stake or interest, if any, that the investigator or research institution has in the research." 59 As in California, New Jersey defnes "material" as "$10,000 or more in securities or other assets valued at the date of disclosure, or in relevant cumulative salary or other income, regardless of when it is earned or expected to be earned or as otherwise determined by the research institution." 60 In addition, for the population of participants identifed in the statute, New Jersey requires disclosure of "the name of the sponsor or funding source, if any, or manufacturer if the research involves a drug or device, and the organization, if any, under whose general aegis the research is being conducted." 
Other Guidance
In 2001, the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) proposed that fnancial conficts of interest be disclosed in the informed consent forms signed by research participants, stating, "[t]he precise wording of disclosure in the consent form should be determined by the IRB, but should include an explanation of the fact that the fnancial interest in question has been reviewed by the COI committee, approved subject to committee oversight, and determined by both the committee and the IRB not to pose any additional signifcant risk to the welfare of research subjects or to the integrity of the research." 62 In 2008, the AAMCAssociation of American Universities (AAU) Advisory Committee on Financial Conficts of Interest in Human Subjects Research recommended that investigators report "all of their outside fnancial interests," no matter how small, as long as they were "directly or indirectly related to their professional responsibility to the institution." 63 This was a departure from the 2001 AAMC recommendations, pursuant to which investigators were instructed to report only their fnancial interests that were "signifcant" and "would reasonably appear to be affected by [their] research."
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Various medical associations have also opined on disclosure of fnancial incentives to research participants and patients. For example, the American Medical Association (AMA) has stated that the "nature and source of funding and fnancial incentives offered to the investigators must be disclosed to a potential participant as part of the informed consent process." 65 Similarly, the American College of Physicians' ethics manual states that "[p]hysicians must disclose their fnancial interests in any medical facilities or offce-based research to which they refer or recruit patients." In addition, the trade association for pharmaceutical companies, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), has revised its Principles on the Conduct of Clinical Trials to recommend that "[c]linical investigators should disclose to potential research participants during the informed consent process that the investigator and/or the institution is receiving payment for the conduct of the clinical trial." 67 Like other codes that commend confict disclosure, PhRMA's recommendations require only disclosure of the existence of compensation, with no requirement of quantifcation.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Confict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice's 2009 report observes that public disclosures of conficts of interest are benefcial if they lead physicians to avoid situations that could potentially compromise their professional independence, but that transparency can be harmful if researchers react by avoiding relationships "that promote important societal goals and that are accompanied by adequate measures to protect objective judgment." 68 The IOM report calls on researchers to report all information potentially giving rise to conficts of interest to a variety of entities, including their academic homes, and supports a requirement for companies to disclose their relationships with physicians and researchers on a public website (essentially the requirement adopted in PPACA). 69 A minority of the IOM Committee members would have gone further, proposing that academic physicians and researchers be required to publicly disclose their industry relationships via a website. 70 The majority of the Committee members opposed this obligation as redundant of company reporting requirements, invasive of researchers' privacy, unnecessarily costly, and unfairly singling out principal investigators in academic settings. 71 The IOM's recommendations emphasized that "disclosure of individual and institutional fnancial relationships is a critical but limited frst step in the process of identifying and responding to conficts of interest." 72 At the international level, the Declaration of Helsinki, issued by the World Medical Association, requires that the "sources of funding, any possible conficts of interest, [and] institutional affliations of the researcher" be disclosed to all potential participants in human research. 73 The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), an international, non-governmental, non-proft organization representing the biomedical scientifc community, recommends that " [b] efore requesting an individual's consent to participate in research, the investigator must provide [information regarding]… the sponsors of the research, the institutional affliation of the investigators, and the nature and sources of funding for the research[.]" 
THE INTENDED GOALS OF DISCLOSURE
Scholars, professional organizations, and policy institutes have advanced various justifcations and goals for requiring disclosure of fnancial interests by investigators and research institutions. Briefy, these goals include the following:
Respecting Participants' Right to Know
The "right to know" is premised on the idea that there are certain kinds of information to which a person is morally entitled, based on the individual's status as an autonomous moral agent. A core argument for requiring researchers to disclose their conficts of interest is that, because research participants are the ones who will be exposed to the risks of the research, they have a moral right to know how the investigator and research institution stand to beneft from the trial. 75 As some respondents to a recent survey put it, participants "might feel morally wronged" if they learned of an investigator's fnancial relationships in a study "after the fact." 76 Establishing and Maintaining Trust in Physicians and Clinical Research 78 77 A 2003 article on conficts of interest in research observed that "there is virtual unanimity that the ultimate goal of reform is to promote public trust in the human research enterprise." 79 This notion of public trust is refected in almost every statement addressing conficts of interest in clinical research. For example, in their 2008 report, the AAMC and AAU stressed that a central goal of confict management strategies is to promote public trust in research. 80 Additionally, the AAMC in a separate report stated that its recommendations sought to maintain public trust in order to "retain the confdence of those who generously volunteer to participate in research." 81 
Protecting the Integrity of Clinical Research Results
A signifcant concern about conficts of interest is their potential to undermine the reliability of research data. Many calls for disclosure refect these concerns. For example, in recommending disclosure of researchers' fnancial interests, the AAMC emphasized that disclosures should be structured to avoid "any additional signifcant risk to… the integrity of the research." 82
Deterring Troubling Financial Relationships
In some contexts, the ultimate goal of mandating disclosure is to change the discloser's behavior. 83 It has been suggested that divulging investigators' fnancial relationships will create pressure on researchers to eliminate "unproductive" conficts. 84 This expectation "assumes that investigators dislike having to disclose their fnancial interests in clinical trials and will avoid relationships that might suggest a confict of interest." 85 
Dispelling the Therapeutic Misconception
The "therapeutic misconception" refers to the mistaken belief that decisions about the type of interventions given to research participants are based primarily on an individualized 86 The therapeutic misconception is widespread among both research participants and even many physician-investigators. 87 Some proponents of disclosure argue that highlighting the fnancial relationship between investigators and sponsors will alert prospective subjects to the fact that the primary goal of the study is to develop scientifc knowledge, rather than to advance the medical best interests of the individual participants.
88

Protecting Research Participants' Welfare
It is possible that studies in which investigators or research institutions have fnancial conficts of interest may pose greater risks of injury to participants than studies without such conficts. If conficts do in fact increase risks, requiring disclosure could protect individuals by making prospective participants more wary of enrolling, or by discouraging investigators and institutions from entering into the troubling arrangements in the frst place.
89
This was essentially the argument made in the lawsuit brought by the father of Jesse Gelsinger, an 18-year old with ornithine transcarbamylase defciency who died as a result of his participation in a Phase I gene transfer study at the University of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit against the University and investigators alleged that the investigators committed fraud by not revealing that an investigator, the University, and other offcials had fnancial relationships with Genovo, the biotechnology company that would take the gene vectors being studied to market in the event of a successful trial. 90 Jesse's father learned that the "principal investigator, James Wilson, owned stock in... [the] company [he had] founded, which contributed $4 million per year to human gene therapy research at the University… where the experiment took place," and claimed that had Jesse known about these fnancial interests, "he would not have agreed to take part in the research study." 91 The suit ended in a confdential settlement in 2000, six weeks after it was fled. In 2005, the University of Pennsylvania and Children's National Medical Center agreed to pay over $1 million in a False Claims Act settlement with the federal government to resolve allegations that the institutions failed to disclose necessary information and misled the government about the benefts of the treatment (the three physicianinvestigators-including Wilson-were also parties to the settlement). 92 The
THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE AS A RESPONSE TO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN RESEARCH
In our previous White Paper, Drug and Device Promotion: Charting a Course for Policy Reform, we concluded that conficts of interest created signifcant risks to the integrity of the physician-patient relationship, medical education, and clinical research. 93 We proposed a variety of policy reforms to address these concerns, including banning industry-provided gifts, meals, and other perks to physicians; establishing clear guidelines for disseminating publications on off-label use of products; and creating new limits on industry funding of continuing medical education.
94
In that White Paper, we stressed the importance of increased transparency in industryphysician relationships.
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While our primary focus was on public disclosure requirements, such as those contained in the recently-enacted health reform legislation, 96 we also suggested that fnancial support from industry should routinely be disclosed to participants in clinical trials as part of the informed consent process. 97 Based on further research and refection, however, we have become increasingly skeptical that disclosure is likely to provide signifcant protections to research participants or the integrity of research. This skepticism has not led us to change our basic position on the need for transparency, but it has led us to reconsider our conclusion that discussions about fnancial relationships should be routinely incorporated into the process of informed consent. Rather than burdening the already dysfunctional informed consent process with mandatory disclosures that are unlikely to achieve most of their soughtafter benefts, we propose that fnancial relationships in clinical research be disclosed under a system modeled on transparency initiatives undertaken in other areas of health and consumer affairs. We also reiterate our call for direct measures to eliminate, reduce, and manage conficts of interest in research, as outlined in our White In this section, we revisit the goals of disclosure discussed in the previous section. We conclude that disclosure would promote participants' moral "right to know," but that it is unlikely to achieve most of the other sought-after benefts. In the next section, we explain why disclosure of conficts of interest should not routinely be included in the process of obtaining informed consent from research participants.
The Right to Know
Empirical evidence of research participants' desire for information about fnancial relationships demonstrates that fnancial incentives matter to some potential research subjects. One study, consisting of in-person interviews of 253 participants in cancer-research trials, revealed that a large minority-40%-wanted to be informed about the oversight system for investigator fnancial conficts of interest, and nearly a third wanted to be told about investigators' fnancial interests, regardless of the monetary value. 98 Another study surveying 259 participants in six clinical trials for non-acute conditions conducted at Royal Melbourne Hospital in Australia found that 57% wanted to be informed about the sponsor of the clinical trial and 34% wanted to know how much funding was accrued at study completion. 99 A third study consisting of 16 focus groups conducted in 2004 and 2005 similarly found that many participants wanted to know about fnancial interests in research, even those who did not think it would make a difference in their decision to enroll in a study. In a qualitative study of 33 individuals with serious, life-threatening, or chronic conditions who had participated in NIH studies for extensive periods of time, most respondents wanted to be informed about physician fnancial interests. 101 They thought that prospective participants should be informed about investigators' fnancial interests, but only a few said that they would want the full details. Similarly, a survey of over 5,000 individuals with chronic conditions who had indicated a willingness to participate in clinical trials revealed that most respondents wanted to be informed about potential conficts of interest, even though only a minority (ranging from a low of 2% to a high of 32% depending the nature of the hypothetical fnancial tie) would actually decline to participate due to a perceived confict. 102 In both of these studies, the individuals who wanted information about fnancial relationships tended to be more highly educated.
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While a subset of research participants is clearly interested in receiving information about fnancial incentives, it does not appear that the information is likely to affect many individuals' ultimate decision to participate. 104 In one study, for example, the authors surveyed a random sample of 470 adults diagnosed with coronary artery disease.
105 All respondents were presented with an informed consent document for a hypothetical clinical trial evaluating a new medication to treat their disease. For one group, the informed consent document provided no information about investigator fnancial ties. For a second group, the document stated that the investigator received a per capita payment that covered the costs of research, including the investigator's salary. For the third group, the document stated that the investigator was an investor in the company sponsoring the research. The informed consent documents shown to the second and third groups stated that an IRB and another committee had reviewed the fnancial interest and did not believe that it would affect the safety or scientifc quality of the trial. They were also told that more information was available on request. The authors found that per capita payments had no effect on participants' willingness to enroll, although they did fnd that an equity holding by the investigator signifcantly decreased willingness.
Similarly, a 2006 survey study of 297 undergraduates found that various investigator conficts of interest did not have a statistically signifcant effect on the students' willingness to participate in a hypothetical clinical trial. 106 The survey respondents were asked the importance of: (1) an investigator employed by the sponsor; (2) an investigator employed by the sponsor and paid a fee for each participant who completed the study; and (3) an investigator who developed the product under investigation and would receive royalty payments from all potential sales. 107 None of the three conficts of interest affected the students' willingness to participate.
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Whether disclosure of information is likely to affect an individual's decision may depend on whether the individual believes she has options or alternatives. 109 The importance of genuine choice cannot be understated: "the value of information nearly always depends on the potential for someone to act on it. Although creating a naked 'right to know' can be seductive in the heat of politics, lasting beneft from disclosure generally requires the availability of choice through entry and exit, ongoing control, political voice, or other forms of self-help through legal or extralegal mechanisms." 110 In the fnancial context, for example, a would-be investor, once provided with information about an advisor's relationship with a company whose stock she is recommending, is likely to understand that he can choose not to invest at all or invest in something else. 111 Prospective participants in clinical trials, by contrast, often do not believe they have realistic alternatives outside the study. For some prospective participants, clinical trials offer the last hope when all other treatments have failed. Although it may be possible for these individuals to obtain investigational treatment outside of a study, either by obtaining an 
Establishing and Maintaining Trust in Physicians and Clinical Research
The argument that disclosure will enhance trust is dubious on both empirical and ethical levels. As an empirical matter, it is simply not clear what impact disclosure of fnancial relationships will have on trust in physicians or research institutions. One study showed no statistically signifcant difference in investigator trust between potential research participants told of per capita payments made to the investigator and those told nothing at all.
114 Participants who were told that the investigator had an equity interest, on the other hand, were less trusting than those who were told of per capita payments and those who were told nothing. 115 Interestingly, trust in the sponsor and institution was not affected by disclosure at all. 116 Other studies have found that disclosure of fnancial incentives could undermine trust in the physician, 117 or could have no effect. 118 One study found that when enrollees in a capitated managed care plan were told how the plan compensated participating physicians, their trust in their doctors increased. 119 More importantly, as an ethical matter, it is not clear why promoting trust in researchers or research institutions is desirable. It is possible that, to the extent that disclosure enhances trust, potential participants will not exercise enough caution in weighing the risks and benefts of studies.
120 Unalloyed trust might also exacerbate the problem of the therapeutic misconception. For example, in one study, " [m] any volunteered that they trusted their physician and that he or she would not ask them to participate unless they were regarded as an appropriate candidate."
121 For these individuals, a healthy dose of skepticism might be more benefcial than measures to promote greater trust. One of the main goals of informed consent is, after all, to encourage individuals to behave as active decision-makers about treatment or research opportunities.
Protecting the Integrity of Clinical Research
To the extent that fnancial relationships between industry and researchers or institutions create a risk to data integrity, disclosure of those relationships is unlikely to eliminate that risk. Despite disclosure, conficted investigators would still be in a position to infuence study design, recruitment of subjects, the conduct of trials, or the reporting of results in a manner that is favorable to the investigators' fnancial interests. The AAMC and IOM both outline a variety of appropriate responses when fnancial relationships create risks to research or data integrity, including eliminating the conficts or managing them through techniques like independent data monitoring, 122 asking the investigator to reduce the interest creating the confict, changing the project design, or substituting a principal investigator without a confict of interest.
123
Deterring Troubling Financial Relationships
There is little to no evidence that disclosure will, in fact, infuence physician-investigators to modify problematic behavior by avoiding questionable relationships or deciding not
The Limits of Disclosure as a Response to Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research
to participate in research. Indeed, it is possible that physicians will be more willing to enter into these relationships if they think that disclosure "sanitizes" them, thereby giving them a perceived "free pass." 124 As some commentators have suggested, "by laying their cards on the Disclosure of fnancial relationships may make both investigators and participants believe that the disclosed arrangements do not pose any risk because if there had been any concerns the arrangements would never have been approved.
Dispelling the Therapeutic Misconception
Although it has been posited that disclosure of fnancial relationships to potential research participants might reduce the therapeutic misconception by shedding light on the relationship between the investigator and the sponsor, we doubt that the therapeutic misconception can be so easily dispelled, particularly where physicians refer their own patients to participate in research. For example, in one study, 24% of participants who were a part of other ongoing clinical research trials reported no risks or disadvantages of their treatment, even though they had previously been explicitly told about such risks.
128 Some commentators note that disclosure might "paradoxically" reinforce the therapeutic misconception, explaining that "[d]ata suggest that some people place more faith in an experimental intervention when the investigator has a fnancial stake in the product being tested, believing that the investigator's investments signal his or her confdence in the product." 129 Other evidence suggests that participants might believe that a greater fnancial interest would make the investigator do a better job, due to his or her investment in the outcome of research and the product or drug being tested.
130
Protecting Research Participants' Welfare
The danger that fnancial relationships between companies that sponsor research and investigators or institutions will lead to riskier studies is a serious concern. However, the proper remedy for this problem is the elimination or management of problematic conficts, through the mechanisms outlined in our previous White Paper. Relying on disclosure to prospective participants on the theory that these individuals can then protect themselves by asking the right questions is unrealistic and may lead institutions to become lax in their oversight responsibilities. It is also unlikely to help those who need it most. As social scientists have observed, disclosure of fnancial incentives is most likely to have a benefcial impact on the "sophisticated estimator," even though "unsophisticated estimators are exactly the ones who are most likely to need protection from exploitation." 
DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST SHOULD NOT BE INCORPORATED INTO THE INFORMED CONSENT PROCESS
The previous section explained why disclosure of fnancial conficts of interest is unlikely to achieve most of the goals espoused by advocates of disclosure. In itself, that is not an argument against incorporating a discussion of conficts of interest into the informed consent process; even if the potential benefts are small, disclosure might still be appropriate if the costs are equally low. In fact, however, adding discussions about conficts of interest to the informed consent process would impose signifcant burdens that outweigh the limited expected benefts. For this reason, requiring routine disclosures of conficts of interest to potential research participants would be unwise public policy.
First, informed consent documents are becoming increasingly long and complex, thereby confusing and overwhelming potential research participants.
132 Evidence indicates that participants are often unable to sift through the morass of information to tease out the content they fnd salient or material. 133 Adding to the already lengthy document by including information that participants may be unable to process or absorb-and which is of less utility than information related to the risks, potential benefts, and alternatives to research-will simply exacerbate the problem. Indeed, evidence shows that information overload, particularly where it includes irrelevant or insignifcant information, can cause decision-making that is worse than if the user had been provided less information or no information at all. 134 For example, disclosing fnancial relationships may cause participants to overemphasize the importance of the information, increasing the salience beyond its intended signifcance.
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In recognition of the danger of information overload, one might suggest that the solution is to include brief statements regarding investor/industry fnancial relationships in the informed consent process. Yet, in one qualitative study, Kevin Weinfurt and colleagues found that brief, concise statements about fnancial interest within informed consent documents were rarely understood, and sometimes only served to confuse potential participants.
136 Other commentators have noted that "the cure for the mandated disclosure failure is not as simple as merely make-them-simple. Sometimes even a simple mandate to disclose simple information has undesirable consequences." 137 These fndings are unsurprising. Given the level of trust that pervades the relationships between participants and investigators, one would imagine that only highly sophisticated or skeptical individuals would intuit that disclosures of conficts of interest are designed to alert participants of the risk the researcher is acting in a self-interested manner. Further, even if prospective participants understand why the information is being provided, they would have no context within which to evaluate the information. For example, most people would have no way of knowing whether a particular confict is signifcant, or whether it has infuenced the study design.
Theoretically, one response to this concern would be to provide longer descriptions, explanations, and context to disclosures of fnancial information in informed consent documents. However, Weinfurt and colleagues found that, even after longer descriptions about fnancial interests were provided, many participants required discussion with the group to understand the meaning of the descriptions. They explained, "[e]ven when participants did understand the defnitions, they did not always understand why the information was relevant to them." 138 Further, because an individual's level of education correlates with the level of concern about investigator fnancial interests, 139 commentators have cautioned that an unintended harm of mandated disclosure is that it can lead to inequity. Disclosure could very well help "most those who need help least and help least those who need help most," thereby increasing the disparity between educated and uneducated, or rich and poor. 140 Our conclusion that fnancial conficts of interest should not routinely be disclosed as part of the informed consent process is not inconsistent with the California Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. Regents of the University of California. 141 In that case, a physician removed the plaintiff's spleen as part of the plaintiff's treatment for hairy-cell leukemia. He then encouraged the plaintiff to return for several follow-up visits during which additional tissue was removed. Throughout this entire time, the physician was using the plaintiff's biological material in experiments that had considerable commercial potential, but he never disclosed this fact to the plaintiff. 142 The research ultimately resulted in the production of a valuable commercial product, and the plaintiff sued for a share of the profts. Although the court concluded that the plaintiff did not have a "property interest" in the product developed from his biological material, it found that he had stated a valid claim for breach of fduciary duty or, in the alternative, failure to obtain informed consent. The court reasoned that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have wanted to know about the physician's research activities, because those activities created "a possibility that an interest extraneous to the patient's health has affected the physician's judgment."
143
While Moore creates the possibility that, in the right set of circumstances, a physician's failure to disclose research-related fnancial interests could give rise to liability, it does not mean that any and all fnancial relationships with industry must necessarily be disclosed. Rather, as in any informed consent claim, liability would depend on the plaintiff's ability to establish the element of causation-i.e., that, if the omitted information had been disclosed, a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would not have consented to the procedure.
144
Such proof would be possible only in situations involving truly serious conficts, and as we explained in our previous White Paper, studies with such conficts should not be permitted to proceed. 145 In other words, our proposed approach to informed consent presumes that any confict serious enough to affect a reasonable person's decision about enrollment has already been eliminated, and that the only conficts that remain are relatively minor. For the reasons set forth above, we believe that requiring disclosure of these residual conficts would not be good public policy; we also believe that the failure to disclose them would not be grounds for liability under Moore.
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INFORMATION ABOUT FINANCIAL INTEREST SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH OTHER MECHANISMS
Although we oppose the disclosure of fnancial conficts of interest as part of the informed consent process, we recognize that some potential participants will want this information.
147
In order to accommodate these individuals, and to promote the inherent ethical value of transparency, we encourage the dissemination of information about fnancial relationships in research through other mechanisms, such as in pamphlets provided in doctors' offces and on physician and hospital web sites.
148 Consumer guides such as those released by the American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) can aid potential enrollees in understanding the rights and responsibilities of research participants and suggest questions that participants can ask their physicians to put the information in context. 149 We should not, however, place too much faith in these methods as a means of changing behavior, as experience in other areas of health and consumer affairs has shown that the benefts of mandated disclosure are often quite limited. For example, laws mandating quality report cards for hospitals have not been as effective as originally hoped due to the limitations in the state of the art of quality measurement, ambiguity as to what information patients actually need, and an inadequate understanding of how consumers process disclosed information.
150
Moreover, research has shown low cooperation by healthcare workers and a failure to report or integrate information into communications with patients. Additionally, quality report cards have led to unintended harmful consequences. For example, report cards on bypass surgery reportedly caused some hospitals to "game" the system by rejecting sicker patients. 
CONCLUSION
Transparency is an important ethical value. Financial relationships between commercial sponsors of clinical research and investigators or research institutions should not be kept secret. It does not follow from this that information about such relationships should be incorporated into the informed consent process, however. Available empirical evidence suggests that doing so would provide few, if any benefts to research participants and could in fact cause signifcant harms. To the extent that fnancial relationships between sponsors and investigators are problematic, they must be directly regulated. Research participants cannot be expected to protect themselves against the risks that fnancial relationships pose to researchers' judgment. Research, 2003 , 303 JAMA 137, 140 (2010 'N 126, 129 (2002) ("For years physician-investigators in academic settings have accrued substantial secondary gain to themselves or their departments from clinical trials, but as compared to the private practice setting, in academia direct personal fnancial gain has rarely been possible.").
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